2026-11-05 –, Lotus Stage 2
EIP-7702 gave EOAs code, breaking assumptions embedded in years of deployed smart contracts. So how much did we actually break? We'll analyze mainnet contracts to measure affected patterns, demonstrate how delegated EOAs can turn old assumptions into vulnerabilities, and examine real 7702 attack surfaces. We'll also explore delegation implementations and tooling to detect vulnerable contracts, malicious delegations, and help users safely unlock 7702's potential.
EIP-7702 changes security assumptions that have existed since Ethereum's earliest days. This talk studies the consequences for both existing smart contracts and users adopting 7702.
We'll analyze deployed mainnet contracts to identify patterns that rely on pre-7702 EOA behavior, quantify how widespread they are, and determine when these assumptions become exploitable. Through concrete examples, we'll demonstrate how delegated EOAs can interact with contracts in ways their developers never anticipated and examine emerging attacks that abuse 7702 delegation.
We'll also compare existing 7702 delegation implementations and the security properties and tradeoffs they introduce. Finally, we'll present approaches and tooling for detecting post-7702 vulnerabilities, identifying potentially malicious delegations, and helping developers and users choose and interact with delegation implementations safely.
Software Engineer at Ethereum Foundation Spec Team, responsible for benchmarking, tooling integration and test enhancement.